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Abstract: The polysemy of the phrase cultures populaires reflects the struggles to define the 
relationship between culture and the people in France. This paper displays the variety of the 
social and political uses of this phrase and recalls the issues it raises. It also explains the 
ambiguities of cultural policy programmes towards ‘low’ culture, most of these programmes 
remaining oriented in a culturally legitimist approach even when they try to promote 
alternative forms of culture.  
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Lowbrow culture and French cultural policy: the socio-political logics of a 
changing and paradoxical relationship 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Lawrence Levine has shown in his seminal book on the American case that we must not 
regard the categories we use to classify cultural forms as neutral, trans-historical descriptions 
of aesthetic contents. Rather, these categories are the result of an antagonistic socio-historical 
process of hierarchisation in which social groups and professions define their social status 
together with the value and significance of cultural goods (Levine 1990). Levine’s historical 
contribution can to some extent be combined with Bourdieu’s sociological analysis of the 
distinctive uses of cultural hierarchies (Bourdieu, 1984). The two authors show the 
arbitrariness of these hierarchies and their double relationship with social structure as both 
products and symbols of class hierarchies. By doing so they remind us that judgements about 
‘low’, ‘popular’ or ‘indigenous’ cultural forms are never a matter of ‘pure’ taste, whether they 
be critical or enthusiastic. They express the more or less negative or positive relationship to 
the social groups linked to these cultural forms (the working class, youth or migrants). 
 
Public cultural policy can play a role in the making and the reproduction of these cultural 
classifications, as shown in my analysis of the making of ‘culture’ as a specific policy 
category in France (Dubois, 1999). In that book, I tried to show how contemporary state 
cultural policy has been invented, shaped and institutionalised, from the end of the nineteenth 
century to the end of the twentieth. An important question was how the borders of cultural 
policy were established, what definition of culture prevailed, what kind of cultural activities 
were included or excluded. In this process of inclusion and exclusion which defined the 
proper domain of cultural policy and provided the official definition of what culture is and is 
not, ‘low’ culture was of course a key issue1. The reflections presented here are based on this 
earlier work and on more recent research on the way French cultural policies deal with ‘folk’, 
‘popular’ or ‘minor’ forms of culture.  
 
                                                 
1
 I will use the terms low or lowbrow culture rather than popular culture for linguistic and conceptual reasons 
explained in the first part of this paper. 
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Questions of definition  
 
I will start with the standard question of definitions. This question must especially be raised in 
a paper dealing with France since the literal translation into French of the phrase ‘popular 
culture’ (cultures populaires, most often used in the plural) is polysemous, controversial and 
has even more general and various connotations than the English term which is itself 
ambiguous (Storey, 2006). My point is not to discuss what would be the best definition of 
cultures populaires but to briefly underline the competing or overlapping definitions used in 
cultural policy institutions and debates. 
 
Three main meanings can be distinguished from this point of view. The first is perhaps the 
closest to the English sense of popular culture as mass culture, or culture disseminated widely 
by the cultural industries and the media. In the  1960s ‘mass culture’ was often used in policy 
discourse, almost always in a negative sense. The Ministry of Cultural Affairs used it in 
contrast with ‘real’ culture, that is to say high culture. Governmental cultural policy was at 
this time supposed to propose an uplifting alternative to mass culture, which was considered 
facile and ‘inauthentic’. Malraux refused to use the phrase culture populaire and explained: 
‘Culture is popular because of those it reaches and not because of its nature’2. That is to say: 
there is no ‘popular culture’ defined by its content, but culture (narrowly defined as the 
consecrated forms of heritage and art) can become ‘popular’ when it is spread among the 
people, especially among the sizeable working class. This was a direct answer to those, on the 
left and especially among fractions of the Communist Party, who claimed to promote culture 
populaire defined as the cultural expression of the working class. As for left-wing politicians 
and cultural policy entrepreneurs, they also denounced mass culture as numbing the minds of 
the working class, in contrast with ‘authentic’ folk culture and/or the emancipation achieved 
through access to the so-called universal classical culture. Culture de masse sounds a little old 
fashioned nowadays. More commonly used today is the expression ‘commercial culture’, 
which evokes the aesthetically and politically dubious products of entertainment companies. It 
can sound insulting to artists, professionals  or policy makers in the cultural sector, because of 
the opposition it implies between art and money structuring it (Bourdieu, 1996).  
 
                                                 
2
 (Tranlated by the author) : ‘La culture est populaire par ceux qu’elle atteint, non du fait de sa nature’ (Speech to 
the Assemblée nationale, 1966).  
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Once again most cultural policy programmes are implicitly or explicitly designed in 
opposition to these forms of ‘popular culture’. 
 
The second meaning is more general and also more often used. Culture populaire is in this 
case opposed to learned culture, in the same way as low, non-institutional or amateur are 
opposed to high, institutional and professional. Cultural policy and above all state cultural 
policy has contributed to the institutionalisation of such distinctions. Since its creation in 1959 
the Ministry of Culture has mostly been the department for professional artists: amateur 
cultural practices have been taken into account only rarely and recently. More generally it was 
mostly concerned with high culture; what Malraux called the masterpieces of world heritage. 
An official separation was made at the beginning of the 1960s between culture with a capital 
C (the exclusive focus of governmental cultural policy) and ‘intermediate’ or ‘everyday’ 
forms of culture, handled under rubrics such as animation socio-culturelle or éducation 
populaires and left to associations, local authorities and to the Department of Youth and 
Sports (Dubois, 1999; Urfalino, 1996). This hierarchical separation was incarnated in the 
distinction between the Maisons de la Culture launched by Malraux and the Maisons des 
Jeunes et de la Culture (MJC) created after the Second World War under the authority of the 
department of youth and sports. The former were managed by professional artists, were 
intended to bring ‘the highest forms of culture’ to the people and were called ‘cathedrals of 
culture’. The MJC, on the other hand, were multipurpose establishments with social and 
educational activities and progressively included specifically cultural ones3.  
 
Governmental cultural policies later contributed to a reconsideration of this hierarchical 
distinction. This was primarily the case in the 1980s during Jack Lang’s Ministry (Looseley, 
1995: 113-134; Dubois, 1999: 278-298). In this context, cultures populaires refers to positive 
and sometimes mythical aspects like spontaneity, authenticity, links to real life, and in fact 
everything that elites view as a kind of popular ‘paradise lost’. The purpose of cultural policy 
in this case was to allow these cultural forms to be regarded as valuable when they usually 
were not. Most of the ambiguities and contradictions of cultural policy stem from these two 
faces of cultures populaires, alternately despised because they are not regarded as ‘real’ 
                                                 
3
 On the history of the Maisons des Jeunes et de la Culture and the evolution of their activities towards culture, 
see Besse, 2008. 
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culture, or integrated in a flagship policy programme in order to restore the dignity policy 
makers think such cultures deserve.  
 
Finally, cultures populaires can be defined in social terms, that is, referring to the culture of a 
specific social group. This can include youth culture or the culture of minorities such as 
migrants or even local culture. This social definition of culture is a broad one, which can 
include folk art, traditions and lifestyles. We will see that it is sometimes related to specific 
cultural policies oriented towards the preservation of an ‘ethnographic heritage’ or towards 
‘social integration’. Once again it has much to do with the definition of the boundaries of 
cultural policy itself. Above all the social definition of cultures populaires refers to the culture 
of the working class (culture ouvrière). Here the political issue is the representation of this 
class, claimed for instance by the French Communist Party’s cultural programmes between 
the two world wars and during the 1950’s. Even in that case, however, there is still a 
hesitation between culture ouvrière as proletarian culture, expected to replace bourgeois 
culture in revolutionary mode, and the goal of giving the workers access to culture (even to 
bourgeois culture) in a perspective of social emancipation.  
 
These uncertainties over definition are not only conceptual ones. They also reveal cultural and 
political issues and conflicts certainly not specific to France but which are, or were, 
particularly important in that country. The main points in these issues and conflicts can be 
summed up in the following general questions raised in cultural policies and politics. How is 
culture in general to be defined, and who has the authority to define it? And then: what 
deserves public support? The question here is whether cultural policy must only confirm and 
reproduce the dominant definition of cultural value or whether it has a proactive role to play 
in this definition and its evolution. What is or should be the relationship between culture and 
the people, and how should it be organised? Are the people defined by their need to be 
‘educated’ and ‘elevated’ or by their participation in cultural creation? Before showing how 
these rather abstract interrogations are involved in very concrete questions, I will recall some 
of the main characteristics of French cultural policy determining the way this policy has 
addressed them. 
 
French cultural policy vs. low culture: some determining factors 
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The determining role played in France by cultural policies and by public institutions in 
cultural life in general gives them an important place in the processes of cultural legitimation4. 
As Raymonde Moulin has shown, cultural officials can have a strong influence in the 
consecration of artists (Moulin, 1992). More generally they act as gate-keepers certifying 
what culture is valued, or what can and cannot be regarded as ‘real’ culture. ‘Artistic 
counsellors’ (conseillers artistiques) working within the local services of the Ministry of 
Culture, for instance (directions régionales des affaires culturelles), claim to have a labelling 
function of this kind, which can have direct consequences on professional recognition and on 
access to public and private support. If we move on to a more general level we can say that 
cultural policies in France play an important symbolic role in the social representations of 
culture: to put it bluntly, what is regarded as ‘culture’ is what gets the support of the Ministry 
of Culture. 
 
This symbolic power is centralised. Despite the decentralisation reforms initiated in the 
1980s, Paris continues to dominate not only the administrative and political fields but also the 
cultural field (Menger, 1993). The fact that not only the Ministry but most of the major 
cultural institutions, and almost all national publishers and newspapers, in other words almost 
all of the cultural legitimation authorities, are based in Paris reduces the chances of 
recognition for specific or local cultures. The ‘legitimism’ (Bourdieu, 1984) of French culture 
and of French cultural policy, that is to say the socially determined ‘truth’ that there is no 
culture outside elite culture, has much to do with this centralisation.  
 
As we have just seen, the Ministry of Culture has played an important role in this centralism 
and legitimism. It still does, even if things have changed since its creation. We have to keep in 
mind that this department was separated from the Ministry of Education, as well as from 
sports, leisure and popular education, so that it could concentrate on fine arts and heritage. 
This intellectual and institutional specification, together with the founding opposition to 
entertainment and the commitment to the ‘democratisation of culture’ focused state cultural 
policy on culture with a capital C. And popular culture has mostly been seen through the lens 
                                                 
4
 To avoid any misunderstanding I have to specify the way I use the notion of cultural legitimacy. Here I will 
remain faithful to Bourdieu’s classic analyses, which do not define the legitimacy of a cultural good according to 
its aesthetic contents but as the result of the legitimation process consisting in the production of its cultural value 
by ‘the legitimate agents of legitimation’ of the cultural field (e.g. art critics, curators, experts, cultural experts or 
institutions, etc.). As a result when I describe popular cultures of one kind or another as ‘illegitimate’ I do not 
mean that they are illegitimate per se but only that they have not been consecrated through this symbolic 
selection process. 
 7 
of this institutional and elite definition of culture. Local authorities have mainly followed this 
legitimist orientation (Friedberg, Urfalino, 1986).  
 
Another characteristic important to bear in mind is that public intellectuals play or at least 
have played an important role in cultural policy debates in France (Ahearne, 2004; 2010). As 
Pierre Bourdieu would put it, ‘culture’ is the topic par excellence of intellectual debates, and 
the ‘popular’ is an important issue in the struggles among intellectuals who claim to know 
what ‘the people’ is, what they need or what is good for them (Bourdieu, 1983). As a 
consequence most of the different kinds of intellectuals have a position on popular culture. 
Humanists want to enlighten the people through culture, paternalists provide vulgarised 
culture to vulgar people, populists and revolutionaries dream of reversing the social, political 
and cultural order, professional experts give advice to cultural policy makers, and 
conservatives aim to preserve ‘real culture’ from dilution and barbarian invasions (Fumaroli, 
1991). 
 
In this connection, the popular culture question has also been debated in the political field. 
The Right and Far-Right sometimes use this theme, to promote traditional values through 
‘grassroots’, ‘authentic’ or local cultures, or to condemn the so-called cultural establishment 
which is deemed to be ruled by leftists (Dubois and Matz). But this conservative populism is 
less important to cultural policy than the debates on culture populaire within the Left. Briefly, 
left-wing cultural populism has always failed in French cultural policies, for diverse reasons. 
In the mid-1930s the Communist Party quickly abandoned the implementation of the class 
struggle model in favour of the promotion of humanism and national cultural heritage 
opposed to fascism (Péru, 1991; Ory, 1994). Workerism did not totally disappear, but there 
was not much social realism in France and communist cultural policies implemented by the 
Party and municipalities have followed the classical pattern of providing high culture to the 
people rather than replacing high culture by working class culture (Lambert and Matonti, 
1998). In the late 1960s and 1970s, at local level, non-communist left-wing cultural policy for 
culture populaire was oriented towards everyday culture, neighbourhoods, creativity for all 
and so on. But it was soon abandoned with Lang’s artist-centred policy in the 1980s, and 
replaced by the previously mentioned policy of cultural promotion. Let us turn now to these 
changing policy strategies in this field.  
 
Policies towards low culture: strategies and ambiguities 
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It would be possible to identify general trends and patterns. For example, cultural policies 
have attached more importance to popular culture since the beginning of the 1980s; theatre 
and visual arts policies are more legitimist than dance and music policies; state institutions 
tend to promote elite culture in the name of aesthetic quality, whereas local authorities can 
sometimes be more opened to intermediate forms of culture, in the name of proximity or local 
traditions. But to do so would be far too simple and sometimes misleading. I would modestly 
suggest only two general rules. First it seems very difficult to find cultural policies that really 
break from a legitimist point of view, that is to say handling popular culture without referring 
it to high culture. Second, policy programmes designed for popular forms of culture usually 
mix together different logics and goals, which often contradict each other. In order to make it 
as clear as possible, I will present five attitudes or strategies as five ideal-types, knowing that 
in concrete policies these types often merge. These propositions are partly inspired by the 
work of Jean-Claude Passeron (Passeron, 1991). 
 
The first and perhaps most frequent attitude is ignorance and neglect. Until the 1980s state 
cultural policy considered popular culture mostly in a negative way, as not worthy of public 
support. This remains partly true. Venues for rock music can get public support but are mainly 
self-funded, whereas opera houses and classical music institutions such as the Opéra National 
de Paris get around 70% of their budget from subsidies. Moreover ‘popular’ as well as ‘folk’ 
cultures are often still regarded as fake culture by cultural officials, the goal of cultural policy 
being to divert people from it. This s still true of amateur music such as brass bands for 
instance: when I asked him about the difficulties being experienced by brass bands, the local 
advisor for music at the Ministry of Culture simply replied ‘who cares? Let them die. They 
are community arts [‘c’est de la tradition locale’] and not our business.’ (Dubois, Méon, 
Pierru, 2009). 
 
There is also an indirect proselytising strategy: using popular culture as a lure to lead people 
to high culture, or at least to cultural institutions where they would not go otherwise. For 
instance, programming a hip-hop show in an opera-house (Lafargue de Grangeneuve, 2003) 
or curating a graffiti exhibition in an art museum (Dubois, 1999: 282-292) can be conceived 
as a means of bringing youngsters from the suburbs to these places, with the hope they will 
come back more easily to see something else. Far from being a ‘populist’ orientation 
celebrating the virtues of those forms of ‘urban art’, this is an indirectly legitimist policy 
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oriented towards elite culture, in which the temporary and selective invitation of non-
institutional forms of culture is seen as a concession in order to bring a ‘new audience’ to 
cultural institutions – or at least to show the providers of public subsidy that efforts are being 
made to attract this audience. 
 
This symbolic manipulation of ‘low’ cultural forms is also at work in a third and more 
common attitude consisting in using these cultural forms for non-cultural purposes, which 
raises the question of the way cultural policy programmes are articulated with other policy 
fields. We can see for instance this non-cultural use in programmes aimed at tackling social 
problems by cultural means. Among many examples, the most important and recent one 
certainly is the use of cultural projects within the urban policy programme launched in the 
1990s and named politique de la ville, (literally: ‘city policy’), which is in fact a policy for 
underprivileged suburban areas (Kiwan, 2007). This urban cultural policy has many different 
aspects and orientations, from a soft form of social control of idle youths to the promotion of 
citizenship; from the promotion of ethno-cultural diversity to the celebration of ‘urban 
cultures’. At the beginning of the 1990s the programme for local rock venues was launched in 
a plan for ‘urban social development’ (développement social urbain) viewing it as a positive 
activity for youngsters in deprived neighbourhoods; it was not launched in an arts policy 
perspective viewing French local rock bands as valuable from a musical point of view and 
deserving public support for that reason (Brandl, 2009: 50-51). More recently hip-hop has 
become the ‘cultural signature’ of urban programmes (Faure, Garcia, 2005; Lafargue de 
Grangeneuve, 2008). There are also attempts to promote its aesthetic value (see below). But 
most of the time these programmes deal with hip-hop just as they would do with football or 
with a trip to the countryside: as a way of keeping young people busy, of re-socialising them 
and of giving them a chance to escape the routine of suburban life at least for an afternoon. 
But in return it also has symbolic effects which can be in contradiction with cultural 
rehabilitation, reproducing the stereotyped representation of hip-hop as an activity related to 
underprivileged teenagers often issued from migrant parents rather than just as an enjoyable 
and interesting kind of dance. Here the question is: is cultural promotion still cultural 
promotion when it is organised for social and not cultural purposes? Or cannot a low or 
popular culture (such as ‘urban culture’) be regarded (also) for its content rather than (only) 
for the social functions it is supposed to fulfil? 
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Although it is logically in contradiction with this ‘manipulation’ strategy, ‘aesthetic 
promotion’ in Richard Shusterman’s sense often overlaps with it in practice (Shusterman, 
1992). There are few applications of Shusterman’s pragmatist aesthetics, looking from an 
artistic point of view at things that are generally not regarded as art or advocating for the 
aesthetic the value of what is usually regarded as low or folk art. But most often, this 
promotion is also a transformation. Hip-hop dance is again a good example. Its promotion in 
cultural policy programmes does not only transport it from the street to the stage. Professional 
choreographers include it in their choreographies, create new shows with it, use it as a source 
for art dance and reshape it so that it fits with the dominating aesthetic criteria. In the end hip-
hop is absorbed by a legitimate form of art more than it is promoted as an autonomous form 
of popular culture (Looseley, 2004, 2005). Aesthetic promotion is then denounced, by those 
who have not undergone these processes of institutionalisation5, as a cultural hijacking. 
Promotion policies for brass  band music are another example (Dubois, Méon and Pierru, 
2009: 251-268). Based on the acknowledgement of the fact that people usually look down on 
this music regarded as ‘old-fashioned’ if not ‘bad taste’, these policies do not try to show how 
it can be interesting from a historical and/or musical point of view. They implicitly 
acknowledge that it is old fashioned (when they call for a stylistic update), bad quality (when 
they encourage the hiring of professional conductors in order to ‘improve the level’), or bad 
taste (when they advocate for a more ‘demanding’ repertoire). Contrary to aesthetic 
promotion as defined by Shusterman these policies do not constitute a plea for the cultural 
recognition of a folk form of music; they rather constitute an attempt to convert this music 
into a form that complies with the rules of the institutional music field. 
 
This conversion policy can consist in the ‘museification’ and/or scientific objectification of 
cultural objects or activities. This fifth and last ideal-typical strategy is not at all a new 
orientation. We might think of folk literature in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (de 
Certeau, 1998), of the ‘metropolitan ethnography’ and the musée des arts et traditions 
populaires (the museum of folk arts and traditions) in the 1930’s6. Here ‘popular’ (in the 
sense of folk) culture is mostly seen through the vision and interests of the elite. It is not a 
                                                 
5
 Because they have not been selected and/or because they adopt a ‘countercultural’ or ‘underground’ attitude 
rejecting any kind of institutionalisation.  
6
 The national folklore programme under the Vichy regime is partly linked to these previous experiences (this is 
a highly controversial point) but with a different political meaning oriented towards the glorification of the ‘real 
people’ incarnating eternal France and the denunciation of the ‘cosmopolitan elite’ accused of being responsible 
for ‘national decline’ (Faure, 1989). 
 11 
living culture to be organised and promoted but rather a set of ‘objects of curiosity’ (in both 
the common and museographic senses of the term) to be displayed. Michel de Certeau 
referred to this interest as the ‘beauty of the dead’, arguing that in this perspective popular 
culture became worthy of attention only when it was disappearing, or had disappeared. 
Museification plays an active role in this process, by detaching culture from its environment, 
resulting in a symbolic taming. In this perspective we could say that curiosity kills part of the 
socio-political meaning and potentially subversive strength of cultures populaires defined as 
the history, lifestyles and mentalities of the lower classes. The policy of ethnographic heritage 
made by the Ministry of Culture is a good example of this neutralisation process. In France as 
in other countries it developed in the 1980s, a period of massive deindustrialisation. The 
conversion of mine shafts and blast furnaces into coal mining and steel industry museums in 
Northern France and Lorraine was a means of symbolic compensation for the last of 
generations of miners and steel workers (Tornatore, 2010); it has also become a symbol for 
the cynicism of a planned political abandonment of mass workers’ employment. This 
ambiguity provides additional evidence that dealing with cultures populaires is also if not 
above all dealing with major social and political issues. 
 
The so-called ‘crisis’ of the French cultural policy model (Dubois, 2011) is mainly based on 
the (questionable) ‘failure’ of cultural democratisation which, together with budget problems 
and the rise of new issues such as the funding of contract workers in the entertainment sector 
(les intermittents du spectacle) and the effects of the internet on cultural practices and 
copyright, has challenged the role of the Ministry of Culture. But it has not radically changed 
the structure of these official attitudes towards low culture. The five ideal-types I outlined 
remain relevant to describe the current situation, and they matter nowadays in concrete policy 
making in more or less the same way as they did at the beginning of the 1990s. This does not 
mean that nothing has changed since then. For various reasons the symbols of elite culture, 
especially in contemporary art and music, are increasingly debated (if not criticised) in the 
media and in the political field for getting large amounts of public money but attracting only a 
small or a ‘snob’ audience. In a context of financial austerity such criticisms may can 
encourage budget cuts for these art forms; but they hardly ever help more ‘popular’ culture to 
obtain more public support. In other words, challenging cultural legitimism in this context has 
more to do with the weakening of state cultural policy than with the readjustment of public 
support among cultural hierarchies. 
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The evolution that has occurred since Nicolas Sarkozy’s election as President of the Republic 
in 2007 is a good illustration of this orientation. With his connections in show business7, his 
pop singer wife, his omnipresence in the popular press, his statements on the pointlessness of 
classical culture or his remoteness from intellectual life, Nicolas Sarkozy projects the public 
image of a President who is closer to popular culture than his predecessors. This intentionally 
demonstrates his closeness to the economic fraction of the bourgeoisie (as opposed to the 
cultural fraction) rather than to the ordinary people and the lower classes. The cultural 
populism of this ‘bling’ culture’ is above all a rejection of the ‘cultural establishment’, said to 
be mostly ‘leftist’. 
 
All of this has implications in terms of cultural policy, or at least in terms of policy discourse. 
The first (and until now main) cultural policy statement made by Nicolas Sarkozy was his 
letter to Christine Albanel when he appointed her as Minister of Culture in 2007. One of the 
points most commented on was his plan to involve non-professionals (i.e. representatives of 
the public) in commissions which award grants to artists, in order to satisfy the cultural 
expectations of the people (‘les attentes du public’) and not only the preferences of the 
cultural milieu. This plan has not been implemented but could be interpreted as the sign of a 
new orientation towards a ‘market-driven populism’ against contemporary artists and cultural 
professions,which could lead to a shift replacing the traditional cultural policy of ‘supply’ 
(providing the people with quality culture) with a new ‘demand’-led policy (giving the 
people/consumers what they want). Similar comments can be made about the Council for 
Artistic Creation. This new institution was created in 2009 in competition with the Ministry of 
Culture, which was deemed to be unable to launch innovative cultural projects. As can be 
expected the members of the Council are directors of cultural institutions, higher civil 
servants, academics, journalists or artists: no representatives of the public here. The ongoing 
programmes of the Council do not deal with folk or ‘low’ forms of culture, but they tend to 
short-circuit the formal cultural institutions with an important use of the internet or a mobile 
school for cinema. Once again political criticism of ‘institutional culture’ challenges the 
cultural policy system (much to the satisfaction of the neoconservative electorate, which 
mainly comes from the economic bourgeoisie), with little effect on the actual distribution of 
public support to ‘popular’ forms of culture (and on the promotion of the lower classes). 
 
                                                 
7
 Such as the rapper Doc Gyneco or the comic Jean-Marie Bigard. 
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Conclusion 
 
The strong embeddedness of these questions in socio-political issues is fundamental for 
understanding the various ambiguities and paradoxes in the relationship between low culture 
and French cultural policy. This policy was launched at the beginning of the 1960s to unite 
people in a common admiration of elite art. This national communion (in the religious sense 
of the term) implied setting aside social and cultural divisions in the name of the celebration 
of a single (elite) culture. Social classes and especially the working class were taken into 
account as targets of the cultural democratisation programme, but there was no place for ‘low’ 
or ‘popular’ culture which was seen as a source of division and above all as ‘dubious cultural 
goods’ (to quote one of Malraux’s higher civil servants), that the Ministry of Culture had to 
fight rather than promote. We cannot fully understand this cultural policy orientation without 
having in mind the historical context of the making of the Fifth Republic and the return of 
General de Gaulle as head of the state (Dubois, 1999, 155 sq). Culture was a new field of 
intervention symbolising the government style that the new regime intended to incarnate, 
based on the authority of the state, the messianic programme of national and political 
grandeur and a charismatic relationship to the people. This historical context was also 
structured by the political and cultural strength of the Communist Party and its workerist and 
anti-bourgeois orientation at this time: the relationship between ‘culture’ and ‘the people’ was 
a political issue because it provided the occasion to express antagonist visions of society. If 
we think now of the second crucial period of state cultural policy in France, that is to say the 
beginning of the 1980s, the opening up of the definition of culture to new, ‘minor’, ‘popular’ 
or ‘lower’ forms of culture must also be placed in the context of a major political shift with 
the arrival of François Mitterrand and the Socialist Party to power in 1981. Once again culture 
was erected as a symbol for political change and a new vision of society. But this time ‘low’ 
culture was integrated into governmental ‘cultural democracy’ programmes to show a new 
general orientation towards youth, migrants or the disadvantaged. 
 
We could go on with other examples but these two determining periods are enough to show 
that when cultures populaires are at stake we have to take political and social dimensions into 
account and not only cultural ones in the narrow sense of that term. This brings us to a first 
paradox: how a cultural policy mainly designed to promote elite culture against ‘low’ culture 
could come to deal with non-elite forms of culture. We have explored the various typical 
strategies in this field and seen that the aesthetic promotion of non-elite culture was most of 
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the time caught up in the cultural hierarchies it intended to change. To end with a more 
normative statement, I would say that in an ideal world, the emancipation of low culture 
should be achieved starting from its specific values and logics8, rather than from the point of 
view of legitimate culture, which makes ‘low’ culture a dominated culture. This is not a 
populist statement, arguing that ‘popular’, ‘folk’ or ‘low’ cultures are self-sufficient, as 
valuable as high culture or even superior to it. Nor is it a definitive criticism of the handling of 
popular culture in French cultural policy. Rather, it is a reminder that we cannot think of the 
promotion of non-elite culture without placing it in the perspective of cultural domination, 
which is too often the case in cultural policy, and increasingly the case in cultural sociology. 
 
                                                 
8
 To paraphrase Marx’s famous sentence ‘The emancipation of the workers will be achieved by the workers 
themselves’. 
 15 
References 
 
Ahearne, J., 2004. Between cultural policy and theory: the cultural policy thinking of Pierre 
Bourdieu, Michel de Certeau and Régis Debray. Coventry: Centre for cultural policy studies, 
University of Warwick, research paper no. 7. 
Ahearne, J., 2010. Intellectuals, culture and public policy in France. Approaches from the 
left. Liverpool: Liverpool university press. 
Besse L., 2008. Les MJC de l’été des blousons noirs à l’été des Minguettes, 1959-1981. 
Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes. 
Bourdieu P., 1983. Vous avez dit ‘populaire’? Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 46: 
98-105. 
Bourdieu, P., 1984. Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of taste. London: 
Routledge. 
Bourdieu, P., 1996. Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field, Stanford 
University Press. 
Brandl E., 2009. L’ambivalence du rock: entre subversion et subvention. Une enquête sur 
l’institutionnalisation des musiques populaires. Paris: L’Harmattan. 
De Certeau M., 1998. Culture in the plural. University of Minnesota Press. 
Dubois V., 1999. La politique culturelle: genèse d’une catégorie d’intervention publique. 
Paris: Belin. 
Dubois V., 2011. Le ‘modèle français’ et sa ‘crise’ : ambitions, ambiguïtés et défis d’une 
politique culturelle. In Saint-Pierre D., Audet C. (eds.), Tendances et défis des politiques 
culturelles : cas nationaux en perspective, Québec, Presses de l’université Laval 
(forthcoming). 
Dubois V., Matz K., forthcoming. La politisation contre les politiques culturelles: retour sur 
les « affaires » culturelles. In Dubois V., Le politique, l’artiste et le gestionnaire, Broissieux: 
Croquant. 
Dubois V., Méon J.-M., Pierru E., 2009. Les mondes de l’harmonie: enquête sur une pratique 
musicale amateur. Paris: La Dispute. 
Faure S., Garcia M.-C., 2005. Culture hip-hop, jeunes des cités et politiques publiques, Paris: 
La Dispute. 
Faure C., 1989. Le projet culturel de Vichy. Paris: PUF/CNRS. 
Friedberg E., Urfalino P., 1986. La décentralisation culturelle au service de la culture 
nationale. In Moulin R. (ed.), Sociologie de l’art, Paris: La Documentation française, 23-30. 
Fumaroli M. 1991. L’Etat culturel: essai sur une religion moderne, Paris: éditions de Fallois. 
Kiwan N., 2007. When the cultural and the social meet: a critical perspective of socially 
embedded cultural policy in France. International Journal of Cultural Policy, 13 (2), 153-167. 
Lafargue de Grangeneuve L., 2003. L’Opéra de Bordeaux, la danse hip-hop et ses publics. In 
Le(s) public(s) de la culture. Politiques publiques et équipements culturels, Paris: Presses de 
Sciences Po, 343-357. 
Lafargue de Grangeneuve L., 2008. Politique du hip-hop: action publique et cultures 
urbaines. Toulouse: Presses universitaires du Mirail. 
Lambert B., Matonti F., 1998. Les ‘Forains légitimes’: élus communistes et metteurs en scène, 
histoire d’une affinité elective. In Dubois V. (ed.), Politiques locales et enjeux culturels. 
Paris: La Documentation française, 333-360. 
Levine L., 1990. Highbrow, Lowbrow: the emergence of cultural hierarchy in America. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Looseley D., 1995. The politics of fun: cultural policy and debate in contemporary France. 
Berg: Oxford/New York. 
 16 
Looseley D., 2004. Popular music in contemporary France: Authenticity, politics, debate, 
Okford/New York : Berg Publishers. 
Looseley D., 2005. The return of the social. Thinking postcolonially about French cultural 
policy. International Journal of Cultural Policy, 1 (2), 145-155. 
Menger P.-M., 1993. L’hégémonie parisienne: économie et politique de la gravitation 
artistique. Annales. Histoire, sciences sociales, 48 (6), 1565-1600. 
Moulin R., 1992. L’artiste, l’institution et le marché, Paris: Flammarion, 1992 
Ory P., 1994. La Belle illusion: culture et politique sous le signe du Front populaire 1935-
1938. Paris: Plon. 
Passeron J.-C., 1991. Figures et contestations de la culture. Légitimité et relativisme culturel. 
In Le raisonnement sociologique, Paris: Nathan, 291-334. 
Péru J.-M., 1991. Une crise du champ littéraire français: les débats sur la ‘littérature 
prolétarienne’ (1925-1935). Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 89, 47-65. 
Shusterman R., 1992. Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Storey J., 2009. Cultural theory and popular culture. Pearson Education. 
Tornatore J.-L., 2010. L’invention de la Lorraine industrielle. Paris: Riveneuve. 
Urfalino P., 1996. L’invention de la politique culturelle. Paris: La Documentation française. 
 
 
 
